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Sanctifying Minority Status in the Himalayan Ummah:
Eid al-Ghadeer Commemorations Among the Shia in
Leh, Ladakh
Rohit Singh

Drawing on ethnographic data, this article argues
that the Shia in Leh, Ladakh employ religious
ceremonies such as Eid al-Ghadeer to construct
a sense of sacred community and a sanctified
minority status within the Himalayan ummah.
Religious discourses pertaining to minority-hood
are central to how locals define and redefine
themselves in the context of modernity in the
Himalaya. Further, the ceremonial embrace of
their minority status engenders discourses
through which the Shia define their relationships
to local Buddhists, local Sunnis, and broader
global audiences.
Keywords: Eid-al-Ghadeer, Islam, Ladakh, Shia, ummah.
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Introduction
This article explores how the Shia in Leh, Ladakh use
ceremonial occasions to construct religious significance for their status as a minority community. The
data in this article come from 16 months of fieldwork I
conducted in the region from 2012-2013. I worked with
both Buddhists and Muslims in the region incorporating
methods of participant observation of religious ceremonies, recording oral histories, and interviews. These
data demonstrate that the celebration of minority-hood
is key to how Shi‘is1 in Leh envision their place within
multiple contexts including the history of Islamic ummah
(community), their status in local politics, and their
place within a broader global public sphere. Local issues
of identity and belonging remain concerns for these
Muslims for three key reasons. First, locals, as in the case
with the Shia throughout history, strive to justify and
legitimate their minority status in relationship to the
Sunni majority. Second, the Partition between India and
Pakistan in 1947 brought Ladakhis into the geo-politics
of modernity. Ladakhis struggle to define themselves as
bordered subjects and political citizens (Aggarwal 2004).
For Ladakhis, questions of identity remain tied to issues
of political representation, government investment in
infrastructure, increased militarization in the region,
and ongoing dynamics pertaining to inter-religious
relations (Bhan 2013; Bertelsen and Van Beek 1997).
Locally, Shi‘is in Leh must negotiate what it means to be
a minority in a Buddhist majority where inter-religious
tensions often manifest. Globally, mass media connects

the Shia to broader political and religious reform movements. This new global pan-Shia identity is emerging
throughout the Muslim world along with increasing
sectarian conflict (Nasr 2006).
Thus, the marker of minority-status remains central
for locals as they define and redefine themselves in the
context of modernity. In this article, drawing on ethnographic data I conducted in the region,2 I argue that the
Shia in Leh, Ladakh articulate their religious significance of
being a minority group within the Himalayan ummah. The
celebration of minority-hood is prominent during ceremonies when locals collectively remember and reflect upon
narratives pertaining to their past Imams. During these
occasions, they deem themselves an elect minority within
the Muslim ummah, who are under the moral authority of
the Imams. Further, I argue that while invoking collective
memories of past Imams, local Shi‘is craft discourses to
define their community in relation to other populations,
including local Buddhists, local Sunni Muslims, and foreign
governments. I explore these dynamics through the lens
of the local 2012 and 2013 Eid al-Ghadeer commemorations
which I observed in Leh, Ladakh.
Shia worldwide celebrate Eid al-Ghadeer. They believe
that on this day Muhammad publicly declared Ali ibn
Abi Talib (ca. 597-661) as his divinely selected successor.
In doing so, Ali became the heir to the prophet and the
first Imam. Shi‘is believe the Imams are God’s chosen
leaders for the Muslim community (ummah). Shi‘is in Leh
reference Ghadeer narratives to differentiate themselves
from the Sunni Muslim majority on the grounds that only
the Shia recognize Ali as the first and rightful heir to the
Prophet Muhammad. Sermons and narratives delivered
during Ghadeer present Ali as the perfect Muslim who
was God’s chosen successor to Muhammad. Through
discourses relating to Eid al-Ghadeer and public memories
of Ali, Shi‘is in Leh promulgate key doctrines, polemics,
and narratives foundational to how the Shia construct a
collective a sense of identity within the ummah as an elect
minority uniquely partaking in the charismatic authority
of Ali and the Imams. This status, moreover, separates and
distinguishes their place in the Himalayan ummah.
Eid al-Ghadeer Commemorations in Leh
For the Shia, love for their Imams and for the ahl-e bayt
(People of the House referring to the Prophet Muhammad’s
family) is the ideal underlying sentiment for all religious
ceremonies in their liturgical year. Based on Shi‘i hagiographies narrating triumphs and tragedies their Imams
and the Prophet’s family encountered, Shi‘is in Leh divide

their liturgical calendar into two distinct categories of
ceremonial time: Eid (Arabic for festivity, feast, or celebration) and mātam (‘grief’ in Urdu). Times designated as Eid
mark occasions for celebrating joyous events in the lives
of the Imams and the Prophet Muhammad’s family, such
as birth of a specific family member. Mātam, designate
occasions for grieving tragedies that befell the prophet’s
family, such as the death of Hussein at Karbala. The timing
of events designated as Eid or mātam purportedly correspond to the dates of past historical events associated with
Shi‘i holy beings. By ceremonially remembering the joys
of the Prophet’s family during times designated as Eid or
collectively mourning during times designated as mātam,
Shi‘i community members publicly express and reaffirm
their collective identities as Muslims who love and pledge
allegiance to the Prophet and his progeny. Shi‘is in Leh use
rituals, narratives, and discourses connected to the timing
of Eid and mātam to simultaneously affirm their religious
identity as Shi‘i Muslims, their national identity as Indians,
and their sense of local Ladakhi identity. The month
Muharram is the most significant period of mourning,
and it is preceded by Eid al-Ghadeer, an event that Shi‘i
Muslims consider the most important time for celebration.
During Eid al-Ghadeer, locals employ narratives, liturgical
recitations, and religious speeches to ceremonially present
themselves as descendants of a moral minority of Muslims
who recognized the significance of Ghadeer and continued
to support Ali and the Prophet’s family after Muhammad’s
death. Eid al-Ghadeer falls on the 18th day of the month of
Dhu al-Hijjah in the Shi‘i liturgical calendar. Celebrations
take place both in Leh city and in surrounding villages.
In Leh, Eid al-Ghadeer is sponsored by the Anjuman-e
Imamiya (The Society of the Imams), the main organizational body for the Shi‘i community. Commemorations
last two days: women gather on the first day and men on
the second.
Celebrations of Eid al-Ghadeer begin by decorating the
exteriors of the Shi‘i mosque and Imambara (House of the
Imams) with multicolored string lights turned on at night.
Inside Leh’s Imambara, the main location for local celebrations of Eid al-Ghadeer, multicolored streamers are draped
around and tied between various pillars on the first floor
of the building. During Eid al-Ghadeer and other ceremonial gatherings in the Imambara (see Figure 1), the center
of attention is situated in the front of the Imambara.
The first center of attention in front of the Imambara is the
minbār, a ceremonial pulpit upon which local sheikhs (religious scholars)3 sit to give teachings; it is also a podium
from where speeches are delivered and from where
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Figure 1. The exterior of an
Imambara located in Chushot
Yokma Village near the city of Leh.
(Singh, 2012)

ceremonial poems are recited that praise the Imams and
members of the Prophet’s family. The minbār resembles
a small staircase about six feet in height with three steps
leading to the top of the structure, there sheikhs sit to
deliver their sermons (see Figure 2). Usually hanging above
the minbār is a picture of Ayatollah Khomeini, indicating
the Leh Shi‘i community’s recognition of Iranian clerical
authority. Behind the minbār is placed an image depicting
Hussein’s tomb in Karbala embroidered within a large
cloth placed inside an archway. Atop this archway hangs a
small framed picture featuring Arabic calligraphy of Ali’s
name. Around the minbār are three key images reflecting
important aspects of Shi‘i identity: Khomeini representing
Shi‘i deference to contemporary clerical authority,
images of Hussein’s tomb at Karbala, and the name of Ali,
the figure who stands as the originator of Shi‘i religious
identity. The three images are not just present during Eid
al-Ghadeer, but are fixed throughout the year.

Figure 2. The minbār or ceremonial pulpit in an Imambara,
Leh decorated with flowers for Eid al-Ghadeer.
(Singh, 2012)
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The other key focal point of the Eid al-Ghadeer commemorations is the podium near the minbār. Microphones are
placed near the podium under which are strung wires
connected to multiple speakers. The podium in 2012 was
decorated with red, blue, and yellow streamers in front,
and khatags (kha bdag) were placed on top of the podium.
Khatags are ceremonial silk scarves, most often white
in color, that are used throughout the Tibetan cultural
world. Embroidered within these scarves are the eight
auspicious symbols of Buddhism. Khatags are exchanged in
various social and ceremonial settings in Tibetan societies.

Figure 3. Ceremonial feasting
in Imambara, Leh during Eid alGhadeer. Food is placed over the
ceremonial dining cloth or daster
khan. The typical custom is for
three Muslims to share one plate.
(Singh, 2012)

Ladakhi Buddhists and Muslims both use khatags. The
eight auspicious Buddhist symbols are also found on the
outside of gates of both Buddhist and Muslim homes alike.
The khatag serves as an inter-religious cultural symbol for
both Ladakhi Muslims and Buddhists. Members of both
religious communities exchange them with each other
during ceremonial occasions. These exchanges indicate
that this ceremonial item serves as a symbol of a shared
civil religion.
The Eid al-Ghadeer ceremonies in both 2012 and 2013
started in the morning and lasted for two hours. The main
assembly room in the Imambara is fairly large and easily
accommodates several hundreds of Shi‘i Muslims in attendance. Most of the audience sat on the large, flat carpeted
area in front of both the minbār and the central podium.
Sheikhs, community leaders, guests, and other highly
respect members were seated on a cushioned area adjacent
to the minbār. This seating arrangement reaffirms local
hierarchies within the community. Various speakers from
the community—including educators, religious leaders,
and highly regarded working professionals—came to the
central podium to deliver Ladakhi or Urdu speeches on the
importance of the day. In between speeches, local school
girls wearing traditional head-coverings (hijab) and local
school boys came to the central podium to deliver Urdu
and English language synopses of the events that purportedly transpired at Ghadeer when the Prophet appointed
Ali as his successor. Groups of school girls periodically
recited Urdu or Balti poetry (qaṣīda) in honor of Ali. The
main speaker of the event was Sheikh Ghulam Haddi, the

senior-most religious leader in the community, who is in
late seventies. Following Sheikh Haddi’s speech, most of
those in attendance proceeded to the local mosque where
they performed their midday namāz (daily worship).
The Culinary Construction of a Minority Community
Collective feasting customs distinguish the Shia from
the Buddhist majority in the city. Rules governing the
exchange of food draw boundaries between insiders
and outsiders within the community. During Eid al-Ghadeer, most of the audience returned for the ceremonial
lunch (see Figure 3). Before meals were served, several
rows of long yellow mats with floral design, upon which
food would be eaten, were spread out throughout the
Imambara. Locals refer to the mats as daster khan, an Urdu
term designating this cloth. One of the leaders of the Leh
Shi‘I community, explained to me that the daster khan was
placed down to honor and show respect to the food. Daster
khan are also designed to prevent food from falling on the
floor, which is disrespectful to the food. Lunch consisted
of goat meat, rice, and curry. Food was served on large
stainless-steel plates. As is the typical dinning custom for
Leh Muslims, three Muslims sat together to share a single
plate. Three Muslims, after receiving their one plate, mix
the curry into the rice using their right hands. They also
make sure to divide the meat evenly. They dine with their
right hands. According to one elder male, a local leader I
spoke with at the Imambara, the practice of sharing one
plate was done to show brotherhood: “when sharing the
food, there is never a feeling of ‘I am better than you or I
HIMALAYA Volume 38, Number 2 | 79

Figure 4. Banner inside the
Imambara located at Chushot
Yokma village. From left to right:
Hazrat ‘Abbas, Imam ‘Ali, and
Imam Hussein.
(Singh, 2013)

am clean and you are not… I am rich man, you are a poor
man’”. Sharing food and eating collectively demonstrates
unity and equality among Muslims; dining traditions
thereby foster community building.
Shi‘is differentiate themselves form other Ladakhis by
not eating cooked foods or drinking any liquids from
the hands of non-Muslims such Buddhists. Sunnis eat
from the Buddhists so long as the food is ḥalal (lawful).
Some Buddhists feel angry with Muslims, namely the
Shi‘i community, because these Muslims seemingly view
Buddhists as unclean, evinced by these Muslims not eating
what Buddhists cook. Commensality reinforces social
borders of community for these Muslims.
Two justifications are given by Shi‘is in Leh for not
eating what Buddhists or other non-Muslims cook. First,
Buddhists are unholy because they are not Muslim.
Buddhists’ innate impurity, it is implied, could contaminate their food. Second, the more common justification,
however, is that food from Buddhists is not guaranteed
to be ḥalal because even if the individual food item was
originally halal, it may have been touched by hands or
cooking utensils exposed to haram (forbidden) items like
alcohol. The residue from haram substances can seep
into ḥalal foods. For example, a cup given to a Muslim by
a Buddhist with tea inside may have earlier been used to
serve an alcoholic beverage like chang, a beer made from
fermented barley. If a Buddhist had improperly washed
the cup, the chang could mix in with the tea served to a
Muslim. To minimize the chance of exposure to forbidden
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substances, Shi‘is ideally eat only from the hands of other
Muslims because Shi‘is assume that Muslims follow Islamic
dietary restrictions. During Eid al-Ghadeer, the sharing
of food is a way of publicly binding the community as
one Muslim community dedicated to Ali. Dietary restrictions draw boundaries between insider and outsiders
to the community. Commensality, in short, serves as an
important marker of identity in distinguishing themselves
as a morally pure minority community under the charismatic authority of the Imams.
Narratives and Collective Memories of Ali in Leh
Ceremonial decorations, sermons, and dining practices
are dedicated to Ali, an individual whose hagiographies
are foundational to Shi‘i conceptions of the charismatic
authority of the Imams. Historically, the Shia distinguish
themselves as a minority or faction who supported Ali
as the successor to the Prophet Muhamad. On Eid al-Ghadeer and other occasions during my fieldwork in Leh, I
asked several locals why Ali was special to them. Three
common themes emerged in their responses: (1) Ali was
the mightiest warrior; (2) Ali had perfect religious knowledge; and (3) Ali was a pure Muslim chosen by God to lead
the Muslim ummah after Muhammad’s death. During the
2012 Eid a-Ghadeer, Dr. Shaukat Ali, a community leader,
told me that Ali was the strongest warrior who fought for
the Prophet Muhammad. He cited the Battle of Khaybar
in which Ali used his bare hands to open the gates of an
impenetrable fortress. I also heard one Muslim reference
Ali’s sword, the Zulfiqar, an epic weapon he wielded on the

battlefield. Ali ‘s warrior prowess garnered him the reputation for being a lion among men. In the village of Chushot
Yokma, located roughly 25-30 kilometers east of Leh city,
an image of Ali riding a lion is placed on the walls inside
the village’s Imambara (see Figure 4). Shi‘is in Leh refer to
Ali by the epithet, Amir al- mu’minin, “Commander of the
Faithful”, referring to Ali’s military might and
strategic expertise when he served as a commander in
Muhammad’s army.
Ali’s knowledge is also praised by many Shi‘is, believing
that he embodies complete knowledge of worldly subjects,
such as science, and he also had perfect wisdom of Islam.
Referring to Ali’s ‘ilm (gnosis), speakers at both the 2012
and 2013 Eid al-Ghadeer commemorations quoted a
line attributed to the Prophet Muhammad: “I am a city
of knowledge, and Ali is the gate” Ali’s vast intellect,
according to one youth I spoke with, can clearly be seen
by the Nahj al-Balagah (The Peak of Eloquence), a religious
text purportedly written by Ali featuring sermons and
letters covering a vast scope of topics including creation of
the universe, religious doctrines, and the history of Islam.
According to my informants, Ali’s complete knowledge
enabled him to always know how to properly comport
himself as Muslim.
Shi‘is in Leh also praised Ali for his purity, a quality
making him uniquely qualified to govern the ummah after
the Prophet’s death. They refer to him as ma‘sūm, an Urdu
word meaning ‘innocent’. During the 2013 Eid al-Ghadeer
celebration, a large poster was hung above the Imambara
entrance in Leh (see Figure 5). To the left and right of the
poster were images of the Kabah, the most sacred center

of Islam and the central destination of pilgrimage for
Muslims embarking on the annual hajj to Mecca. Above,
below, and in between these two pictures of the Kabah is
a quote written in both Arabic and English, a statement
made by Muhammad at Ghadeer: “I Have Perfected Your
Religion, And Completed My Favor On You. And Have
Consented With Islam as Your Religion. He whose Guardian
Leader (Maula) was I, This Ali (who stands besides me)
is his Guardian Leader After Me” [sic]. The placement of
the Kabah in this image is significant for Shi‘is due to its
claimed connection to Ali.
At the birth of Eid of Ali in May 2013, Sheikh Qasim,
the chief Sheikh in Leh city, referred to a popular story
according to which Ali’s mother was given permission by
God via Gabriel to deliver Ali inside the Kabah, despite
it being a holy place where no blood is to be shed. God
permitted Ali’s birth inside the Kabah because of Ali’s
innate and special purity. Many religious leaders in Leh
stress that Ali remained pure throughout his life because
since his early childhood he was a Muslim living alongside
Muhammad. Ali, unlike other Muslims who converted later
in their lives and previously practiced other religions,
never ‘worshipped idols’ or partook in haram substances
such as alcohol.
The proclamation quoted in the banner described above
is the main focal point of the Eid al-Ghadeer celebrations.
Shi‘is interpret this quote by Muhammad as meaning he
chose Ali as his successor. Stories culminating with the
declaration by Muhammad are recounted numerous times
during the Eid al-Ghadeer ceremony in Urdu, English, and
Ladakhi. According to oral narratives in Leh, over 100,000
Figure 5. A banner placed above
the entrance to the Imambara,
Leh. Shi‘is believe that the Prophet
Muhammad delivered these
statements at Ghadeer Khum,
thereby officially making Ali
his successor.
(Singh, 2013)
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Muslims gathered in Ghadeer to hear an announcement by
the Prophet during his final pilgrimage to Mecca or hajj.
God told Muhammad to not fear the people. Muhammad
brought Ali to stand before him. Muhammad asked the
congregants if they followed him and they said yes. He
replied that “If you love Ali, you love me. If you hate Ali,
you hate me. Then God will hate you”. Finally, the Prophet
delivered God’s message that whomever over which
Muhammad was master, Ali was now their master. Various
speakers in the Imambara stressed that upon hearing this
all the Muslims at Ghadeer rejoiced, and many, such as Abu
Bakr, the first Sunni Caliph, personally congratulated Ali.
Locals use these discourses to designate their special status
as a moral minority in the ummah, united in support of
Ali as their Imam. They also contrast themselves from the
Sunni majority as they envision themselves as a divinely
guided minority in history of the ummah.
Community and Charismatic Authority
Weber views charisma as: “A certain quality of an individual personality, by virtue of which he is set apart from
ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural,
superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or
qualities” (Weber 1947: 328). Applying Weber’s theories to
Islamic Studies, Liyakat Takim, in The Heirs of the Prophet:
Charismatic and Religious Authority in Shi‘ite Islam, examines
how different Islamic traditions attempt to deal with the
universal problem of the death of the Prophet Muhammad.
The Prophet is a charismatic authority uniquely capable
of uniting Muslims based on divine authority. Takim
cogently argues that whereas other Muslim communities
struggled to routinize the Prophet’s charisma by transferring his charismatic authority onto traditional and legal
institutions—particularly the emerging Islamic scholarly
community (ulema)—the Shi‘is proposed a mechanism
to circumvent routinization, maintaining the Prophet’s
supernatural and exceptional charisma in the world via
living Imams through a hereditary succession of the
Prophet’s charisma (Takim 2006: 24). Locals celebrate Eid
al-Ghadeer as the moment in which the Prophet passed his
perfected knowledge of Islam to Ali. This occasion began
a line of succession whereby the Imams and would sustain
the Prophet’s wisdom and infallibility in the world. These
qualities, which are ‘charismatic’ in the Weberian sense,
uniquely qualify the Imams to have wilāyat (guardianship)
over the Imam.
In her historical study of the doctrine of wilāyat, Maria
Dakake analyzes early Shi‘i writings on Ghadeer Khum
and she argues that the doctrine of wilāyat became
“the ideological conduit for extending a belief in the
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charismatic authority and elite spiritual status of Ali and
the succeeding Imams to the community collectively
and the ordinary Shi‘ites, individually” (Dakake 2007: 7).
Dakake contends that Shi‘is collectively and individually come to “participate in the charisma” of the Imams
because Shi‘is envision themselves as a “charismatic
community” who have exclusive access to the wisdom
and infallible guidance offered by the Imams (ibid). The
charismatic community resonates with my observations of
Eid al-Ghadeer commemorations in Leh; there, some Shi‘is
I spoke with, namely those celebrating in the Imambara,
proudly proclaimed their allegiance to Ali and love for the
Prophet’s family, in contrast to the ‘other sect’.
When examining Leh’s Eid al-Ghadeer ceremonies,
however, we see one important dimension missing from
discussions on charismatic authority as articulated by
Takim and Dakake. While I agree with Dakake that Shi‘is
try to partake of the charismatic authority of the Imams,
it is important to articulate how they do so. Pointing to Eid
al-Ghadeer, I argue that Shi‘is, at least in Leh, connect with
the Imams and their charismatic qualities through timed
ceremonial gatherings. In these gatherings, performances
allow Shi‘is to make sacred figures from the distant past,
such as Ali, imminently present in their collective memories. Performance produces the charismatic authority of
the Imams within the collective memories and narratives
of those gathered in the Imambara. Thomas Csordas’s
theories on charisma articulate this point. In contrast
to Weber’s view of an innate and natural quality within
select leaders, Csordas contends that charisma arises from
linguistic performances “in a mobilization of communal
symbolic resources that are realized in a mode of discourse
or performed in a genre of ritual language within particular social settings” (Csordas 1997: 141). During Eid
al-Ghadeer, Shi‘is in Leh gather in the Imambara for the
ceremonial remembrance of past Imams to invoke the
distinctive qualities of Ali and his descendants through
the performance of poems, speeches, and story-telling.
Through participating in or observing these performances,
Shi‘is connect themselves to the doctrines, narratives, and
ideals constituting Ali’s charisma.
The Doctrinal Foundations of a Charismatic Community
I recorded interviews regarding local theological discourse
on Imams with three sheikhs. These include Sheikh Nasir,
a young scholar in his thirties who studied in Iran; Sheikh
Jawad, a senior Sheikh who studied for several years in Iraq
and whom members of the Shi‘i community praise as their
top intellectual scholar; and a third anonymous Sheikh
who is well-versed in Shi’i polemical traditions. Sheikhs

such as Sheikh Nasir and Sheikh Jawad become the centers
of attention during various times of Eid and mātam when
they sit on the minbār inside Imambaras to deliver tabligh
(sermons) on theological points such as the qualities of
the Imams, issues of justice and injustice, the importance
of loving the Prophet’s family (ahl-e bayt), and what
differentiates the Shi‘i community from other Muslims.
The answers they gave me largely parallel contemporary,
trans-local views espoused by scholars within the Twelver
Shi‘i tradition (Newman 2010 and Ende 1990). Religious
knowledge and education for Shi‘is in Leh arrives largely
from outside the region, such as when local students enter
global centers for Shi‘i scholasticism in Iran and Iraq. Once
they return to Ladakh, they impart this knowledge to
local Ladakhis, especially during Friday prayers or during
ceremonial occasions like Eid al-Ghadeer.
During interviews, local scholars emphasized the significance of Ali and that the other Imams were the rightful
successors to the Prophet Muhamad. Being a minority
tradition in Islam, the Shi’i developed doctrines to argue
for the charismatic nature of their Imams and the Imams
legal right to govern per Islamic law.4 They have cast themselves as an exclusive minority within Islam, guided by the
charismatic authority of the Imams.5
When I asked Sheikh Nasir and Sheikh Jawad about the
source of authority and power for the Imam lineage which
began at Ghadeer, they presented five main points: (1) Ali
and the Imams are divinely selected (nass); (2) the Imams
possess spiritual gnosis (‘ilm); (3) the Imams are infallible
(mas‘ūm); (4) the Imams are connected to the Prophet’s
family (ahl-e bayt ); and (5) the Imams’ existence is necessary for maintaining God’s creation of the human world.
Like speakers at Eid al-Ghadeer, during interviews these
two sheikhs stressed that Ali and the Imams are selected
directly by God. Sheikh Jawad posits, “The Prophets were
made by God. Who made Prophet Muhammad? God.
Just as the Prophets were made by God, we say that the
successors were also. Those who believe this we call the
Shia... The Imams were sent by God just as the prophets
were sent by God”.6 The logic of his argument is based on
the key premise that God always sends divinely selected
individuals for the sake of keeping his laws for humanity
in the world. When it came to revealing his laws, God
sent special individuals in the form of prophets. Just as
God sent prophets to bring his laws to the world, now
that the prophetic lineage has ended, the successors to
the prophets, the Imams, must maintain the laws as the
presented by Muhammad, the last Prophet. Because the
successors must maintain God’s laws in the world, they
must necessarily be divinely selected because God always

sends divinely selected individuals to keep his laws for
humanity in the world. Sheikh Jawad made a key distinction by emphasizing this to be a solely Shi‘i theological
view. The Sunni, in contrast to the Shia, posit that the
successor to the prophet is chosen through elections
within the ummah. Many Shi‘is in Leh directly stated or
indirectly implied that their line of succession, starting
with Ali at Ghadeer Khum, holds a moral and theological
high ground over the Sunnis, whose first three chosen
successors supposedly emerged via human elections and
not through divine will.
These sheikhs also stressed that Ali and subsequent Imams
are not just ordinary men chosen to govern the ummah,
but they were granted spiritual powers by God to do this,
particularly divinely guided gnosis and infallibility that
only Imams possess. Sheikh Jawad described some of the
key Shi‘i beliefs on the innate wisdom or gnosis (‘ilm)
possessed only by Ali and the other Imams:
Khuda [Urdu for God] gives them [the Imams] a special gnosis (‘ilm). Knowledge automatically comes
to them. In their mind knowledge is automatically
present. They do not need to ask questions, to read
texts, or to seek knowledge. We are normal individuals. We have to read to get knowledge or ask questions from others. The Imams are not like us. God
gives them knowledge directly. Knowledge comes
instantaneously to them. Some have to read to gain
knowledge. Some have to ask others. Yet the Imams
do not have to do this. Only the Imams have this
instantaneous wisdom.7
Sheikh Jawad discusses the intellectual qualities of the
Imams. The average person, he claims, lacks knowledge,
and he must make effort to find knowledge regarding any
subject matter, including religious practice. The Imams,
as Sheik Nasir pointed out earlier, possess knowledge
required to instruct Muslims on religious affairs. The basis
for that is the special knowledge given to them by God;
special knowledge manifests as instantaneous wisdom.
Without reflecting or conducting any research, Imams can
immediately provide accurate knowledge to any question
or challenge posed to them. In the Shi‘i perspective, as
Sheikh Jawad stated, no other individuals in the world
possesses such God-given knowledge arising instantaneously. God has made Imams uniquely qualified to teach
and govern the Muslim ummah.
On Eid al-Ghadeer locals commemorate the day this unique
spiritual power was introduced in the world concomitantly with Muhammad ordaining Ali as his successor. An
embodied connection to prophetic knowledge was created
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between Muhammad and Ali. Sheikh Jawad described that
at Ghadeer, “Just as mother pigeons place food directly
into the mouths of their children, Muhammad placed
his knowledge directly into the mouth of Ali. However,
much knowledge the Prophet had about Islam, about the
orders of God, he gave this knowledge directly to Ali”.8
Theologically speaking, God sent his final Prophet to
perfectly establish his laws in the world. Although the final
prophet died and the Imams do not have direct access to
revelation like past prophets, Muhammad’s complete and
perfect knowledge survived because Muhammad directly
transmitted his wisdom to Ali at Ghadeer Khum. This
process of transmission was not a slow process of teaching
and learning, rather it was an instantaneous transmission,
straightforward and direct as a mother pigeon giving
food from her mouth to her children. Locals consider
themselves to be a minority who preserve and live out the
divinely inspired teachings of the Imams.
Stories of Ghadeer create a master narrative for Shi‘is,
presenting a vision of time and history that guarantees
them a divine status under the Imams’ wilāyat or guardianship. The Ghadeer narrative and its corresponding
traditions of hermeneutics and polemics, in short, allow
Leh’s Shi‘is to envision a meaningful place for themselves
within the history of the cosmos (beginning with God’s
creation of the ahl-e bayt), within the history of Islam
(beginning with Ali’s wilāyat), and the end of history,
following the return of Ali, leading to the Day of Judgment,
an event in which Shi‘is will have the love of the ahl-e
bayt and the wilāyat of the Imams as their refuge. Through
public ceremonies, such as Eid al-Ghadeer, locals construct
an image of their community as a minority destined to
serve the Imams and love the Prophet’s family till the
end of time.
Ghadeer Narratives and the Sunni and Shia divide
For Shi‘is in Leh, Eid al-Ghadeer commemorations reaffirm the key narratives, historical reference points,
doctrines, and theological arguments that define them as
a distinct community locally, in Leh, and globally, as part
of a broader Muslim minority within the ummah. Thus
during Eid al-Ghadeer locals address what they perceive
as a moral and theological historical problem: Ali was not
appointed as the head of the Muslim community after
Muhammad’s death, even though Muhammad purportedly
chose him as his successor at Ghadeer. Instead, after the
Prophet’s death, the majority of Muslims appointed and
supported Abu Bakr as the first Caliph. Also, the majority
of the Muslim community has never universally recognized any other Imam as the rightful leader of the ummah,
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with the exception of Ali who served as the fourth Caliph.
The Shi‘is in Leh consider that only their Muslim community celebrates Ghadeer; their Sunni neighbors maintain
that Muhammad instructed his sahaba (companions) to
elect a leader among themselves, culminating in Abu Bakr
succeeding the Prophet. Referencing this Sunni and Shi‘i
difference, at the 2012 Eid al-Ghadeer ceremony one Shi‘i
Muslim argued, “People celebrate this day to be the day
when Ali was chosen as the Prophet’s successor. Those who
follow Ali are Shia. Those who are not are the Other sect”.
The Sunni are the ‘Other’ for the Shia, and that ‘otherness’
was a common subtext during Eid al-Ghadeer speeches in
Leh. The Sunni do not celebrate Eid al-Ghadeer because,
unlike the Shia, the Sunni do not believe Ali was chosen by
God as Muhammad’s successor at Ghadeer.
Shi‘is occasionally critique leaders of the ‘other sect’,
those Sunnis, and the election process that put the Sunnis
in power. Shi‘is maintain that the Caliphs ignored God’s
commandment issued by Muhammad at Ghadeer and
usurped Ali’s right to rule. Shi‘is also contrast how their
Imams’ envisioned qualities with those of the Sunni
Caliphs. Three key themes emerge as to why Shi‘i Imams
held theological high ground over the Sunnis: (1) the
God-given authority of the Imams over the Caliphs; (2)
the innate purity of the Imams in contrast to Caliphs; and
(3) the innate wisdom of the Imams, which the Caliphs
lack. These discourses demonstrate that Eid al-Ghadeer
celebrations offer times and venues for fostering solidarity
among Shi‘is in Leh while to some extent simultaneously
reaffirming borders and divides between the Shi‘is and
their Sunni ‘Other’.
When comparing the Imams to the Sunni Caliphs, the Shi‘is
in Leh highlight foundational differences using two sets of
binary oppositions: (1) between the Prophet’s family (ahl-e
bayt) and the Prophet’s sahaba and (2) between the Imams
and the Sunni Caliphs. While Shi‘is characterize themselves
as devotees of the Prophet’s family and Muslims aligned
with Imams, they cast their Sunni ‘Other’ as committed to
the Prophet’s companions and elected Caliphs.
These polemics and narratives are trans-local in origin, 9
reflecting the foreign religious training of local sheikhs
and an increased affiliation with outside religious groups
through outlets such as mass media. Some Sunnis in Leh
critique the Shi‘is, arguing that many of their doctrines
are innovations (bi‘da) to Islam because these doctrines
are not found within authoritative textual sources,
specifically the Qur’an and hadith. Sunni critiques reflect
broader polemical traditions invoked in contemporary
sectarian conflicts.10 Between the Sunni and Shia in Leh,

longstanding and trans-local traditions of sectarian
polemics manifest, potentially drawing ideological borders
between the two communities.
Sectarian Unity and Local Politics
At the local level Sunnis and Shi‘is in Leh must also
negotiate what it means to live together as one Muslim
minority in a predominantly Buddhist district. In spite
of disagreeing on Ghadeer and occasionally invoking
sectarian rhetoric, usually when the other group is not
present, Sunnis and Shi‘is in Leh enjoy cordial relations.
They interact as neighbors, friends, classmates, and
coworkers. They even occasionally inter-date and even
inter-marry, though this is discouraged. On occasion,
Sunnis and Shi‘is even foster a collective identity as one
Muslim minority community within a predominantly
Buddhist region.
Collective identity is at times central in political disputes.
For example, in 1989 communal politics consumed much of
the Indian nation-state. At this time, Buddhist and Muslim
communities in Ladakh became divided over whether to
remain part of Kashmir. Most Muslims did not support
Buddhist demands for independence from Kashmir. This
created communal tensions in the region for the span of
three years. When Leh experienced communal agitations
from 1989 to 1992, the Sunnis and Shi‘i leaders united
under the banner of the Ladakh Muslim Association;
setting aside sectarian differences Sunnis and Shi‘is
expressed local, public Muslim solidarity against the
Ladakhi Buddhists, their common other (Bertelsen and
Van Beek 1997).
Nowadays, Sunnis and Shi‘is also unify on global political
issues. On the last Friday during the month of Ramadan,
the two communities perform a unity march in Leh’s
bazaar against ‘Western superpowers’. This annual event
is called Youm-e-Quds (Jerusalem Day). Muslim groups
worldwide set aside sectarian differences to participate
in Quds protests. Iranian cleric Ayatollah Khomeini in
1979 promoted the Quds protests to express solidarity
with Palestinian Muslims and to show Muslim unity
against Israel. Thousands of Muslims, including students,
Sunni and Shi‘i religious heads, and members from local
Muslims organizations marched through Leh at the Quds
demonstrations I witnessed in 2014. Sunni and Shi‘i leaders
delivered speeches that condemned the Israeli government as a regime in which the “Zionists have kept the
people of Palestine deprived of their fundamental rights”
(Balkhang 2013). Speakers at Youm-e-Quds called on
Muslims and non-Muslims to support Palestinians and all

other persecuted populations because “it is a humanitarian
obligation to express solidarity with those people whose
rights have been violated by so called superpowers” (ibid).
Pointing to countries like Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, one
speaker called on an end to the spread of terrorism within
Muslim countries.11
Many Sunnis and Shi‘is in Leh use media such as television, newspapers, and the internet to learn about global
issues, particularly politics in Muslim countries. They
view Western nations as superpowers attempting to
divide and conquer Muslims. Islam and all Muslims are
under threat. During Youm-e Quds, Sunnis and Shi‘is in
Leh march against perceived shared external threats by
foreign superpowers such as Israel, and they march against
internal threats from terrorist groups. These internal
threats are global terrorist groups who profess following
Islam. Although Sunnis and Shi‘is differ in their views on
religious authority in the ummah, they consider it their
responsibility on select days, such as Youm-e-Quds, to set
aside their differences and to stand as one Muslim community against common political threats.
On a few occasions, such as the Eid that marks
Muhammad’s birth (Mawlid al-Nabbi), Shi‘is and Sunnis
in Leh unite as one community to honor a shared Prophet
and their shared Qur’an. This specific Eid is celebrated
inside Leh’s Sunni Mosque, where a mixed audience of
Sunnis and Shi‘is listened to Ladakhi and Urdu language
speeches by both Sunni and Shi‘i leaders regarding the
Prophet Muhammad’s legacy. I observed and recorded
speeches from the 2013 commemorations. Apart from the
oneness of God (tawhid), a doctrine foundational to both
Sunnis and Shi‘is, these speakers mentioned few theological concepts; instead, they emphasized the Prophet
Muhammad brought morality and humanity back in the
world. If God had not sent Muhammad and the 124,000
Prophets before him, one speaker argued, “peace would
not be in the world”. The themes of amān (peace) and
insanayāt (humanity) reoccurred in all the speeches.
Although Sunnis and Shi‘is often have contradictory and
conflicting views about post-Prophetic religious authority
and Islamic history, peace and humanity are ideals that
could easily appeal to this inter-sectarian audience.
This call for peace and unity is likely a strategic move
to distance local Muslims from sectarian violence and
militant actives taking place in other parts of the world.
In between speeches, groups of Sunni and Shi‘i school
girls separately sang Urdu language nāts, a genre of lyrics
praising Muhammad. The final speaker was the head
Imam of Leh’s Sunni community who re-expressed

HIMALAYA Volume 38, Number 2 | 85

sentiments given earlier by a Shi‘i leader when he said,
“If one takes on the title of Muslim, and if one then denies
others their rights and they oppress others, then there is
no
value to their Islam… that person does not understand
Islam”. His speech followed a common practice of emphasizing the Prophet as having taught universal ideals of
brotherhood, human rights, and justice. These ethical
principles provide a shared set of values for the mixed
Sunni and Shi‘i audience. Again, it is important to emphasize that these calls for sectarian unity take place in the
context of both contentious local politics and aspirations
for a local Muslim minority to connect with broader
pan-Islamic movements.
A Moral Minority in a Global World Order
Shi‘is in Leh view their community as a persecuted and
moral minority within a global world order in which
‘wahhabi groups’ (a blanket term used by Shi‘is in Leh for
those Islamic groups and regimes considered inimical
to Shi‘ism) and ‘Western Superpowers’ target them. In
modern times they remain persecuted by wahhabi influence backed by ‘Western Superpowers’. A group of Shi‘i
college students I interviewed complained these wahhabis
do not recognize Shi‘is as Muslims; instead, wahhabis
persecute Shi‘is calling them ‘Kafirs’ (disbelievers in
Islam). One student complained the wahhabis deny their
humanity: “They think the Shia are like dogs. If you have
four pieces of bread stacked on top of each other, and if
one Shi‘i eats the top one, they [the wahhabis] will say to
throw the other three away because a dog has eaten from
this stack of bread”.12 Another student complained that
while the wahhabis are fringe groups shunned by virtually
all Muslims, their influence flourishes with support from
‘superpowers’ like America: “Before America, there was
not this degree of violence [between Muslims]. Now we are
cutting each other’s throats. Now Americans are putting
tensions between us. Divide and conqueror [sic] is their
policy”.13 This student echoes beliefs I heard a number of
Shi‘is in Leh express. ‘Western superpowers’, they argue,
fuel tensions between Muslims and prop up wahhabis
regimes such as Saudi Arabia. Some Shi‘is contend that
regimes like the Saudi government fund wahhabis. One Shi‘i
elder insisted to me that “Saudi Arabia wants to eradicate
Shi‘ism from the world,” and to this end “they pour money
like water into countries” to fund anti-Shia propaganda
and finance anti-Shia terrorist groups.
Shi‘is in Leh view themselves as part of a global Shia
community perpetually victimized and viciously targeted
by Western superpowers on the one hand, and on the
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other hand terrorist groups funded by Muslim governments, such as Saudi Arabia, who are purportedly
governed based on wahhabis ideology.
Locals believe, however, that this suffering and persecution is the price they must pay for following God’s orders
at Ghadeer. Just as Ali’s supporters were a moral minority
subjugated by an unjust majority, modern Shi‘is love Ali
and ahl-e bayt in spite of wahhabis attack. One anonymous
source in Leh’s Shi‘i community argues for the moral superiority of Ali’s followers over those who opposed him:
You have two have two groups [of Muslims]: those
who followed Muhammad with their heart and
those who followed Muhammad in name only.
Those who followed with their heart accepted all of
Muhammad’s orders because Muhammad’s orders
were God’s orders. When Muhammad ordered at
Ghadeer that Ali be made his successor, they followed. But another group chose to make their own
successor… One group wanted to follow God and
the other wanted to follow the votes of people. The
two groups became enemies of one another. Those
who followed God were weak. Even today those
who follow truthfulness are weak. They will remain
weak… So the majority oppressed the minority who
wished to follow God’s path… They wished to eradicate them because they thought if this minority is
finished off, ‘we can do whatever we wish,’… Those
on the side of truth can not be eradicated. They
might become weak and oppressed. They have been
like this since the beginning. But they will not
be eradicated.14
The Ghadeer narrative is used to divide Muslims into two
groups: (1) those who proved their obedience to God by
following Ali and (2) those who disobeyed God by electing
their own successor. The source above emphasizes that
Ali’s supporters were in the minority while detractors
enjoyed a decisive majority. Here, he introduces another
common binary opposition in Shi‘i polemical narratives:
minority/majority. The minority holds greater authority
over the majority on theological grounds because they
follow the Imams, God’s chosen successors, whereas the
majority follows ordinary men. Yet, the above source
points out that the minority is comparatively weaker. He
points to the fact that the majority is numerically larger
and hence holds more power than the minority, allowing
the majority to wield earthly power over the minority.
The hidden subtext in the speaker’s words is that the
minority/majority dichotomy is homologous to the Shi‘i/
Sunni opposition. Here again the idea of an elect few is

foundational to their identity as a minority community.
The theology of the ‘elect few’, of course, can be found in
other minority traditions such as Calvinism and modern
millenarian movements. This theology provides minorities
and marginalized groups with rhetorical and doctrinal
support against a perceived hostile majority (Kaplan
1997).15
These discourses, moreover, reflect how locals view their
religious identities as increasingly intersecting with a
sense of Iranian nationalism. In the aftermath of the
Revolution, Khomeini and his Iranian supporters sought to
disseminate their Revolutionary ideology globally even to
relatively remote areas like Ladakh. Iran’s post-revolution
regime, as Islamic studies scholars Esposito and Piscatori
argue, “combined a religiously rooted brand of Iranian
nationalism with a belief in a transnational mission to
spread their version of revolutionary Islam” (Esposito
and Piscatori 1990: 3). This Iranian nationalism and its
revolutionary theology likely entered Leh through two
main outlets: (1) Ladakhi scholars studying in Iran and (2)
various forms of media such as printed texts, television
channels, and social media. I argue that the appeal of the
Iranian Revolution to Shi‘is in Leh and perhaps in many
other areas largely stems from Khomeini’s use of the
two most significant events in Shi‘i historical consciousness—Ali’s succession at Ghadeer and Hussein’s death at
Karbala—to present his ‘Islamic Revolution’ within the
ceremonial frameworks of both Eid al-Ghadeer and
Ashura, thereby using sentiments and symbols from
Shi‘is’ most prominent Eid and mātam to promote his
revolutionary ideology.
Local leaders often praise Khomeini’s seminal work, the
Guardianships of the Jurists or Wilayāt al-Faqih. As stated
earlier, the concept of wilayāt refers to the special guardianship and divinely selected governance of the Muslim
by the lineage of Imams beginning at Ghadeer. Khomeini
argues that at Ghadeer, God established that the ideal
Islamic government rules based on the wilāyat of the
Imams. Without an Islamic government, Islamic laws
cannot survive, for “were God not to appoint an Imam
over men to maintain law and order…religion would fall
victim to obsolescence and decay” (Khomeini 2002: 33).
The problem is that the current Imam is hidden and is thus
incapable of directly governing. According to Khomeini,
while the Twelfth Imam remains hidden, Islamic scholars
must administer and preserve God’s laws through the
institutions of Islamic nation states like Iran. These Islamic
governments will necessarily face persecution by unjust
nations, just like Yazid’s regime attacked Imam Hussein at
Karbala. Now, Islamic governments like Iran, which stand

for Imam Hussein’s principles, will be targeted by Yazidlike political regimes such as America, who wish to spread
tyranny in the world. For these reasons, Khomeini warns
his supporters that “we [Iranians] are under the aegis of
God and the banner of monotheism…Such a
declaration will surely be met with opposition in the
world… We too should follow the example set by Hussein,
so that we too shall be ready to embrace martyrdom”
(Khomeini 1995: 16-17).
Because Shi‘is in Leh view Khomeini’s revolution in terms
of Ghadeer and Ashura, they have a temporal and narrative basis for supporting Khomeini and Iran: Ali’s right
to rule may be usurped, but now Iran represents a nation
governed by scholars administering the will of the Imams.
The Iranian Revolution established Iranian clerics (mujtahids) as heirs to the Ghadeer tradition. Shi‘is in Leh lament
that they could not fight with Hussein against Yazid. Now,
however, they can symbolically stand with a government
following Hussein’s principles, and Shi‘is in Leh can protest
against the American and Israeli governments for purportedly seeking Iran’s destruction. Shi‘is to some extent view
the Iranian Revolution as a modern Ghadeer and a modern
Ashura because from this revolution they received a new
wilāyat in the form of the guardianship from the mujtahids
and new battle of Karbala in the form of struggle against
super powers supposedly opposing the guardianship of the
mujtahids. Thus the concept of the guardianship or wilāyat
of Ali takes on a new significance for locals as they enter
into broader political discourses taking place in a global
public sphere.
Conclusion
Throughout the history of Islam, Muslims have turned to
the ideal of ummah as a unifying force. The ummah, ideally,
constitutes one community of believers with a shared
Prophet and a holy book coexisting as one community
under one God. All members of the ummah are ideally
united into a collective where social distinctions are
irrelevant. Yet, as this case study demonstrated, for some
groups in the Himalaya, such as the Shia in Leh, a sense of
alterity remains intricately tied to community-building.
Locals use public ceremonies such Eid al-Ghadeer, along
with interconnected narratives and religious doctrines, to
celebrate and justify their presence as a minority group
in relation to Buddhists, the Sunnis in the ummah, and to
other nations and religions. Local and national politics,
socio-economic changes, and global based reform movements challenge traditional ideals of identity and place.
The perceived sanctity of being a minority provides locals
with a shared sense of history, community, and moral
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purpose within the context of modernity. During public
ceremonies narratives, rhetoric, and performances build
heterogenous visions of collective community all modeled
after religious ideals pertaining to a minority status. This
case study of Eid al-Ghadeer in Leh, Ladakh demonstrates
the significance of examining the strategic processes
whereby those within the modern Himalayan ummah
deem minority-hood sacred.
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Endnotes
1. I follow conventions often used by other scholars
for implementing various forms of the Arabic term
Shi‘ite, literally meaning party or faction. For describing
individuals and groups I use the term Shi‘i and Shi‘is. I also
use Shi‘i as an adjective, for example, Shi‘i ceremonies.
Shia is a noun referring to Shi‘i Muslims as a single group
or collectivity.
2. Data in this article come from 16 months of fieldwork
I conducted in the region from 2012-2013 with the
support from the American Institute of Indian Studies. I
worked with both Buddhists and Muslims in the region
incorporating methods of participant observation of
religious ceremonies, recording oral histories, and
interviews with various locals.
3. The term ‘sheikh’ in Leh usually refers to Shi‘i men who
have completed higher scholastic training at religious
institutions in Iran or Iraq.
4. See Takim, Liyakat. 2006. The Heirs of the Prophet:
Charisma and Religious Authority in Shi‘ite Islam. New York:
State University Press of New York.
5. In the Charismatic Community, Maria Massi Dakake
demonstrates how the early Shia used wilāyat as a source of
prestige for their community.
6. Sheikh Jawad, interview with author, Leh, Ladakh, 4
October 2012.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
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9. For an edited volume surveying contemporary polemics
and conflicts between Sunnis and Shi‘is, see Maréchal ,
Brigitte and Zemni, Sami. 2006 The Dynamics of Sunni-Shia
Relationships: Doctrine, Transnationalism, Intellectuals and the
Media. London: Hurst and Company. See also Nasr, Vali. The
Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future.
New York: Norton, 2006.
10. See for example Ende, Werner. 1990. Sunni Polemical
Writings on the Shi’a and the Iranian Revolution in The
Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World edited by David
Menashi, 220-232. Boulder: Westview Press.
11. I am describing this event using information from a
local English language newspaper. See Balkhang, Harjira
Bano. 2013. Youm-e-Quds Procession Observed in Leh.
Reach Ladakh Bulletin, 15 August 2013.
12. Field notes, Leh, Ladakh, 7 July 2013.
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